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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Mr. Hall filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
Third Judicial .District Court of Salt Lake County. The petition 
was dismissed on April 11, 1990. This appeal is from that order. 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Section 78-2a-3(f) of the Utah Code Annotated (1990 Supp.). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did Hall file his petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
beyond the applicable statute of limitations? 
2. Are the determinations of the Utah Board of Pardons 
subject to judicial review? 
3. Did the parole guidelines used by the Board of Pardons in 
determining Hall's parole date violate the ex post facto clause 
of the federal constitution? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
U.S. CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 1, SECTION 9, CLAUSE 3 
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 77-27-1 
(5) "Expiration" occurs when the maximum sentence has run. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 77-27-5 
(3) The determinations and decisions of the Board of Pardons 
in cases involving approval or denial of action, of paroles, of 
pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, orders of 
restitution, or remission of fines, forfeitures, and restitution, 
are not subject to judicial review. Nothing in this section 
5 
prevents the obtaining or enforcement of a civil judgment. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 77-27-9 
(1) The Board of Pardons may pardon or parole any offender 
or commute or terminate the sentence of any offender committed to 
a penal or correctional facility which is under the jurisdiction 
of the Department of Corrections for a felony or class A 
misdemeanor except as otherwise provided in Subsection (2). The 
release of an offender shall be at the initiative of the board, 
which shall consider each case as the offender becomes eligible. 
However, a prisonei: may submit his own application, subject to 
the rules of the board. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 3, 1982, Mr. Hall was convicted of Aggravated 
Burglary, Aggravated Sexual Assault, Aggravated Kidnaping, and 
Aggravated Robbery in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County. (Response to Petition Seeking Writ of 
Habeas Corpus). Each offense is a first degree felony. Hall was 
sentenced to concurrent indeterminate terms, not less than five 
years and possibly for life, for each offense, and was 
subsequently incarcerated at the Utah State Prison. (Response to 
Petition Seeking Writ of Habeas Corpus). 
Hall's first hearing before the Board of Pardons occurred on 
March 23, 1983. The Board of Pardons ruled that Hall was not to 
be released from prison at that time, and set a shearing date 
for March of 1988. (Response to Petition Seeking Writ of Habeas 
Corpus). On January 7, 1985, Hall's case came before the Board 
of Pardons on a redetermination. A redetermination is a paper 
review of an inmate's file. The Board of Pardons decided that 
Hall's status was not to change, and maintained the March 1988 
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parole rehearing date. (Response to Petition Seeking Writ of 
Habeas Corpus). 
On March 24, 1986, Hall's case again came before the Board of 
Pardons for redetermination. His status was not changed. 
(Response to Petition Seeking Writ of Habeas Corpus). 
On October 13, 1987, Hall's case again came before the Board 
of Pardons for a redetermination. Again, his status was not 
changed. (Response to Petition Seeking Writ of Habeas Corpus). 
On January 6, 1989, Hall came before the Board of Pardons on 
a rehearing. The Board determined that he should be released 
from the Utah State Prison on parole on September 13, 1994. 
(Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus). Hall filed a petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus in March of 1990. On April 11, 1990, the 
Honorable Judge John A. Rokich denied Hall's petition. (Minute 
Entry). On July 19, 1990, appellant appealed the denial of his 
writ of habeas corpus to the Utah Court of Appeals. (Notice of 
Appeal) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Hall claims that the practical effect of new guidelines used 
by the Board of Pardons in determining parole dates violates the 
ex post facto clause. He claims that under the new guidelines, 
he is being incarcerated four years beyond what would have been 
prescribed under the old guidelines. 
However, the ex post facto clause applies to laws, and courts 
have held that parole guidelines are not mandatory standards and 
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do not have the force of law. Additionally, even if the Board of 
Pardons' guidelines were laws, they did not add to Hall's 
sentence, and therefore did not increase his punishment, which 
must happen in order for a law to violate the ex post facto 
clause. 
Second, the dismissal of Hall's petition should be upheld 
because decisions made by the Board of Pardons are not subject to 
judicial review. When an offender is given an indeterminate 
sentence, the Board of Pardons is vested with virtually total 
control over determining the length of the offender's 
incarceration. Both state and federal case law support the 
assignment of this facet of the correctional process to the Board 
of Pardons. 
Finally, Hall's petition must be dismissed because it was 
filed after the expiration of the applicable statute of 
limitations. 
ARGUMENT 
Mr. Hall's petition claims that the application of new 
parole guidelines violated the ex post facto clause of the 
federal constitution. This claim is insupportable: the ex post 
facto clause applies to criminal laws only, and parole guidelines 
are not laws. The guidelines do not aggravate offenses or make 
them greater than when they were committed. Nor do the 
guidelines change the quantum of punishment annexed to the crimes 
at the time when they were committed. 
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I. MR. HALL'S PETITION WAS UNTIMELY UNDER THE APPLICABLE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS, AND, THEREFORE, ITS DISMISSAL SHOULD 
BE UPHELD. 
The statute of limitations for a writ of habeas corpus in 
Utah is three months. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-31.1 (1953 as 
amended). The Board of Pardons' decisions which Hall challenges 
occurred on March 23, 19 83 and January 6, 1989. His petition was 
filed in March of 19 9 0—well after the statute of limitations had 
expired. The dismissal of his petition must be upheld for 
failure to file within the applicable statute of limitations. 
II. THE DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S PETITION SHOULD BE UPHELD 
BECAUSE BOARD OF PARDONS' DECISIONS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL 
REVIEW. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-27-9(1) (1953 as amended) states: 
The Board of Pardons may pardon or parole any offender 
or commute or terminate the sentence of any offender 
committed to a penal or correctional facility which is 
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections 
for a felony or class A misdemeanor except as otherwise 
provided in Subsection (2). The release of an offender 
shall be at the Initiative of the board, which shall 
consider each case as the offender becomes eligible. 
However, a prisoner may submit his own application, 
subject to the rules of the board. 
(empha sis added). 
When a convicted defendant is given an open-ended sentence at 
the Utah State Prison, the Board of Pardons is solely responsible 
for determining the length of time that defendant will serve. 
This honorable court has held that there are no statutory 
limitations on the Board's discretion in granting or denying 
parole. Hatch v. DeLand, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, (Utah Ct. App* 
1990). 
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Furthermore, the Board's decisions are not subject to 
judicial review- Utah Code Ann, 77-27-5(3) (1953 as amended) 
states: 
The determinations and decisions of the Board of Pardons 
in cases involving approval or denial of action, of 
paroles , of pardons , commutations or terminations of 
sentence, orders of restitution, or remission of fines, 
forfeitures, and restitution, are not subject to judicial 
review. Nothing in this section prevents the obtaining 
or enforcement of a civil judgment. 
(emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that Utah's 
"sentencing system vests almost complete discretion in the Board 
of Pardons to determine the period of time that will actually be 
served." State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 277 (Utah 1985). 
Finally, under Utah's parole statute, a prison term does not 
expire until the maximum sentence has run. Utah Code Annotated 
§ 77-27-1(5) (1953 as amended). Mr. Hall acknowledges this in 
his brief ("Petitioner realizes that the Board could 
theoretically keep him in prison for life."). 
The Utah Supreme Court, Utah Court of Appeals, United States 
Supreme Court, 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, and Utah Federal 
District Court have all ruled that an incarcerated person has no 
right to be released prior to the expiration of his sentence. 
Homer v. Morris, 684 P.2d 64 (Utah 1984) (before a parole date 
has been established, an inmate has no constitutional right to be 
placed on parole); Hatch v. DeLand, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and 
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (no constitutional or 
10 
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Rifai v. United States Parole Commission, 586 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 
1978); Shepard v. Taylor, 556 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1977); Ruip v. 
United States, 555 F.2d 1331 (6th Cir. 1977). 
In Ruip, the Sixth Circuit stated: 
[W]hat is involved in this case is . . . an agency's setting 
up guidelines for itself to assure the uniform execution of 
its business. These guidelines are not law, but guideposts 
which assist the Parole Commission . . . in exercising its 
discretion. Nor do these guidelines have the characteristics 
of law. They are not filed and rigid, but are flexible. The 
Commission remains free to make parole decisions outside of 
these guidelines. 
Ruip, 555 F.2d at 1335. 
In Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539 (9th Cir. 1986), the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that parole guidelines are 
"procedural guideposts without the characteristics of laws." 
Wallace, 802 F.2d at 1553. The Wallace court also held that even 
where the presumptive parole dates are followed in the majority 
of cases, failure to rigidly apply those guidelines does not 
violate the ex post facto clause. 
Hall's reliance on Miller v. Florida, 107 S.Ct. 2446 (1987), 
is misplaced. Miller was a criminal case in which the plaintiff 
had in fact been sentenced to a longer prison term through the 
application of new sentencing guidelines. Board of Pardons' 
decisions are not part of a criminal proceeding. Morrisey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1982). Notably, Miller dealt with 
revised sentencing guidelines, not revised parole guidelines. 
The distinction between sentencing guidelines and parole 
guidelines is critical. The ex post facto clause, by its very 
language, applies only to criminal laws. Article 1 of U.S. 
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to relief under the ex post facto clause is the lack of fair 
notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases 
punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was 
consummated, not an individual's right to less punishment. 
Weaver, 450 U.S. at 30, 101 S.Ct. at 965. No ex post facto 
violation occurs if a change in the law does not increase the 
punishment, change the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate 
facts necessary to establish guilt. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 
(1884) . 
A number of U.S. Courts of Appeals have heard cases similar 
to Mr. Hall's, and have held that retrospective changes in parole 
guidelines do not aggravate the punishment prescribed for a 
crime. See Portley v. Grossman, 444 U.S. 1311 (1980) (Rehnquist, 
J., circuit justice; motion for stay); Warren v. United States 
Parole Commission, 659 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 
455 U.S. 950; Hayward v. United States Parole Commission, 659 
F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 456 U.S. 935 (1982); 
Rifai v. United States Parole Commission, 586 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 
1978); Shepard v. Taylor, 556 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1977); Ruip v. 
United States, 555 F.2d 1331 (6th Cir. 1977). 
In Portley, Chief Justice Rehnquist, sitting as a circuit 
justice on a re-parole case, held that changes in parole 
guidelines do not add punishment retrospectively, since a change 
in these guidelines does not affect the maximum or minimum 
sentence that a court may impose, the point at which the inmate 
becomes eligible for parole, or his mandatory release date on 
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the application of those guidelines did not violate the ex post 
facto clause. 
Therefore, the dismissal of Mr. Hall's petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus should be upheld. 
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Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of August, 1990, I 
caused to be mailed four (4) true and correct copies of the above 
and foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS to: 
Danny Quintana 
Attorney for Petitioner 
395 South 600 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Robert N. Macri 
Attorney for Petitioner 
211 East 300 South #209 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
postage prepaid in the United States iffostal S^wice 
Dane NbjTan 
^Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondents 
16 
